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THE ANTITRUST LAWS IN FOREIGN COMMERCE
Robert A. Nitschke*

T

Sherman Act applies to trade or commerce "with foreign nations."1 Are there differences in the act's application to foreign
trade compared with its application to domestic commerce? The Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws was
constituted at a time when this question was pressing for an answer.
During the 1920's and 1930's, the international cartel movement
was in full Hood. American companies participated in some of these
international arrangements, often in the belief that they were a necessary condition for world trade and upon the legal premise that
restrictions adjunctive to patent and know-how licenses were lawful.
During the 1940's, a barrage of antitrust cases struck at these agreements.2 Cartels were criticized as economically and politically harmful.8
Out of these many cases grew certain special problems which had
not appeared in tp.e cases involving domestic restraints. One was the
problem of extraterritorial jurisdiction. How far over foreign persons
and conduct could the arm of antitrust reach? Secondly, did the
difficulties of foreign trade in the modern world warrant a different
test of Sherman Act liability? Should consideration be given to the
impossibility of doing business in certain countries due to exchange
and tariff restrictions? Were restrictions ancillary to patent, know-how
and trade-mark licenses necessary and permissible? Could a parent
conduct its foreign business lawfully through foreign subsidiaries?
What joint foreign activities with competitors would be permissible?
Thirdly, how could antitrust policy be coordinated with the requirements of the cold war? And, lastly,4 should the United States particiHE

~ Member, Michigan Bar.-Ed.
126 Stat. L. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §§ 1, 2.
2 CCH, THE Fm>ERAL ANrrrnusT LAws (1952) See also cases cited in Carlston,
"Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 N. W. Umv. L. REv. 569 (1954), and Hale and Hale,
"Monopoly Abroad: The Antitrust Laws and Commerce in Foreign Areas," 31 TEX. L.
REv. 493 (1953).
8 For a bibliography on cartels, extraterritorial application of United States antitrust
laws, etc., see ABA Section on Antitrust Law, Proceedings at the Spring Meeting, Washington, D. C., April 1 and 2, 1954, p. 225 et seq.
4 One minor problem was the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918, 40 Stat. L. 517, 15
U.S.C. (1952) §§62, 63, 65, permitting certain restrictive activities by export associations.
The committee took the view that, although the act is not much used, it does help some
small businesses to compete against combinations authorized under foreign law, and, moreover, previous abuses have been corrected by United States v. United States Alkali Export
Assn., Inc., (D.C.N.Y. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 59, and United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947. A minority dissent took the view that it
represented an exemption contrary to the philosophy of the Sherman Act and should be
repealed. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITTEE TO STUDY THE
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pate in the United Nations proposal for international control of
restrictive business practices? Coupled with the strong public conviction that cartels were bad was the growing apprehension that uncertainties in the application of antitrust to foreign trade might be
retarding business enterprise and investment abroad and hindering
cold war objectives at a time when the United States was assuming
leadership in the free world.5 It was most timely, therefore, to have
these issues examined by a committee composed of outstanding authorities in the antitrust field, reflecting all shades of liberal and conservative points of view.
In its Report, the committee rejects, at the outset, any proposal
for general exemptions of foreign commerce from the antitrust laws
or for substantial revision to define specific legal and illegal ~onduct
in foreign trade transactions. 6 The committee states its belief that the
generality of the Sherman Act provides the necessary Hexibility for
its adaptation to any problems peculiar to foreign trade. With these
principles as a guide, the committee proceeds to deal with each of the
particular problems which has come to the fore in connection with
antitrust and foreign trade.

Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The recent investigatory and enforcement activities against cartels
have had an impact upon foreign nationals and indeed upon international relations, raising serious questions as to the extent to which
the United States should attempt to enforce antitrust consequences
upon persons or conduct outside of its territorial jurisdiction.7
.ANnTRoS'r LAws, March 31, 1955, -pp. 109-114 (hereinafter referred to as Ri!POR"r, followed by the page number).
United States Department of Commerce, Foreign Commerce Bureau, FAcroRs LIMUNITED STATES !Nv:EsTMEN'I' ABROAD, Part 2, p. 32 (1954); ABA Section on
International and Comparative Law, RllPORT OF THE CoMMITI'EE ON OOERNATIONAL
TRADE RllcoLATION, "Impact of Antitrust Laws on Foreign Trade," Aug. 6, 1953; "Study
of the Financial Aspects of International Trade and of the Export-Import Bank and World
Bank," RllPoRT OF THE CrnzEN's ADVISORY CoMMITI'EE To THE CoMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY pursuant to S. Res. 25 and S. Res. 183, 83d Cong., 2d sess., p. 19
(1954); President's Message to Congress, March 30, 1954, N.Y. T1MEs, March 31, 1954,
p. 18:1.
6 RllPORT 66.
1 E.g., in United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513,
affd. 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947), the court cancelled contracts made abroad
which prohibited sales by American concerns in certain European countries. The European
parties at one time threatened suit against the American firms for breach of these contracts
claiming they had invested capital in their businesses on the assumption they would be
free from competition from the American concerns.
In the Newsprint investigation, In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum Addressed
to Canadian International Paper Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1947) 72 F. Supp. 1013, subpoenas duces
tecum for documents located in Canada, issued against Canadian subsidiaries of American
5
ITING
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After analyzing all of the important cases8 in the £.eld, the committee concludes that the Sherman Act should be applied in foreign
commerce with due regard for its effect on another nation's sovereignty
or the customary comity between nations. The committee adds, however, that it is not improper to impose liabilities, even upon foreign
nationals, for conduct outside the United States that has intentional
consequences within the United States which United States laws
forbid. Consequently, two standards are adopted:
l. Insofar as arrangements between American £.rms alone or
acting in concert with foreign £.rms are concerned, the Sherman
Act applies not only to conduct in the United States but also to
acts performed abroad with sufficiently substantial anticompetitive effects on our trade and commerce as to constitute unreasonable restraints. 9
2. Insofar as arrangements between foreig!} competitors alone
are concerned, the Sherman Act should ap_ply only where they
are intended to and actually do result in substantial anticompetitive effects on our foreign commerce.10
firms found to be doing business in the United States, stirred up such adverse public
opinion that a provincial statute was enacted prohibiting removal of business records from
Canada without legislative approval. The Business Records Protection Act, 1 Ont. Rev.
Stat., c. 44 (1950).
In the Oil investigation, upon the intervention of a foreign government, grand jmy
subpoenas were quashed against a foreign corporation in which the foreign government
had a substantial interest. In re Investigation of World Arrangements with Relation to the
Production, Transportation, Refining and Distribution of Petroleum, (D.C.D.C. 1952)
13 F.R.D. 280.
In United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., (D.C.N.Y. 1951) 100
F. Supp. 504, decree granted (D.C.N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215, the court ordered I.C.I.,
a British company, to reassign certain patents to the American party so as to preclude those
patents from being used to prevent exports by the American party into Great Britain.
I.C.I. had in the meantime granted an exclusive license to a second British company. This
second British company, suing in English courts, secured an injunction preventing I.C.I.
from complying with that part of the American decree. The British court held that it
would grant performance as against interference by the courts of another land of a lawful
English contract made between English nationals and to be performed in England. British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 2 All E. R. 780 (1952);
British Nylon Spinners v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 3 All E. R. 88 (1954).
8 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 31 S.Ct. 632 (19II);
United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 47 S.Ct. 592 (1927); United States v.
Pacific & Arctic Railway and Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87, 33 S.Ct. 443 (1913); United
States v. National Lead Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513, affd. 332 U.S. 319,
67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949)
83 F. Supp. 284, affd. 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); United States v. General
Electric Co., (D.C.N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753; United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America, (2d Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 416; United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries,
(D.C.N.Y. 1951) 100 F. Supp. 504, decree granted (D.C.N.Y. 1952) 105 F. Supp. 215.
9 REPORT 76. See United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83
F. Supp. 284, affd. 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); United States v. National Lead
Co., (D.C.N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp. 513.
10 REPORT 76; United States v. Aluminum Company of America, (2d Cir. 1945)
148 F. (2d) 416. Neither of these standards apparently deals with "potential" restraints
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The committee recommends that where a foreign party attempts
to enforce abroad against an American party a contract declared illegal
under the Sherman Act, the State Department or other appropriate
federal agency should endeavor to protect the American party. With
respect to foreign nationals, decrees should include a provision that
the judgment shall not operate as against any action taken in compliance with the laws of a foreign government to which the defendant
is subject.11 Conversely, the committee recommends that an American
company should not be held liable for participating in arrangements
in another country (otherwise illegal under the Sherman Act) which
are required by the laws of that country.12
Different Reasonableness Test for Foreign Trade

In its discussion of the Sherman Act generally, the Report concludes that divisions of markets, or agreements not to compete in
specified territories, are to be treated as conclusively unreasonable.13
While recognizing that the same standards of reasonableness apply to
foreign and domestic commerce alike,14 the committee adopts as its
view the statement of Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in the Timken
case that "circumstances of foreign trade may alter the incidence of
what in the setting of domestic commerce would be a clear case of
unreasonable restraint."15 Thus, the Report says that evidence may
be offered to show that, even without any specific agreement not to
export from the United States, export to a particular area was virtually
impossible because of tariffs, import controls, dollar shortages, etc.16
The usual argument against "impossibility" as a justification for
restraints has been that if there is no possibility of trade, why is it
necessary for the parties to agree not to trade? Furthermore, foreign
or restraints "in their incipiency," but it would seem doubtful that the committee intended
to approve agreements which would necessarily result in the prescribed anticompetitive
effects. Nor do the standards distinguish between civil and criminal suits, although the
latter have certainly much less application to foreign nationals and foreign conduct.
11 REPORT 76; United States v. General Electric Co., (D.C.N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp.
753; British Nylon Spinners, Ltd. v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 2 All E. R. 780
(1952).
12 REPORT 83. The Report refers to "price-fixing solely in that country." This could
hardly have the requisite effect on our foreign commerce. The doctrine would seem more
reasonably to apply to foreign quota restrictions on exports or imports.
13 See REPORT 26, dealing with domestic restraints and citing cartel cases.
14 The committtee supports the view that foreign commerce should include, "as
in domestic commerce," capital investment, financing, property rights in patents, trademarks, trade secrets and know-how. REPORT 80.
15Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 605, 71 S.Ct. 971
(1951).
16 REPORT 83. This does not mean it is enough merely to show that the arrangement
was a more profitable way of doing business.
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trade conditions change, and consonant with the rejection of economic
justification for price fixing in the Trenton Potteries case, the government should not have the burden of "ascertaining from day to day
whether it has become unreasonable through the mere variation of
economic conditions."17 Another argument-paralleling the "strict construction" rule given to exemptions under the Sherman Act, which
rule holds illegal anticompetitive conduct in any area not clearly regulated by statutory exemption18-is that when foreign trade conditions
make difficult enough what little trade is left, there is all the more
reason for not allowing that small amount to be shut off by private
restraints.
The Report, however, does not say that "impossibility" by itself
justifies restraints in foreign trade.19 It says, rather, that "impossibility"
is merely a basis for demonstrating that the restrictive conduct was a
prerequisite for trade. The Report again quotes Justice Frankfurter's
opinion in Timken:
'When as a matter of cold fact the legal, financial and governmental policies deny opportunity for exportation from this country and importation into it, arrangements that afford such opportunities to American enterprise may not fall under a ban of a
fair construction of the Sherman Law because comparable arrangements regarding domestic commerce come within its condemnation."20
The real test, therefore, is not impossibility alone, but whether or
not the agreements produced more trade than they restrained. Such
a test might not be permissible in domestic commerce where, presumably, Congress can control the area of desirable competition and
freedom to trade, e.g., states cannot impose restrictions upon interstate shipments.
But as a practical matter in foreign commerce, limited restraints
can produce trade. For example, the importation of certain finished
products from the United States may be virtually prohibited by import controls and dollar shortages, but if these finished products are
manufactured in the foreign country and contain a sufficiently high
percentage of local content, th~ foreign government may..permit the
import by the local manufacturer of raw materials, semi-finished
products and all the components and accessories of a higher technology
17 United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 at 396-398, 47 S.Ct. 377
(1927).
1s United States v. Borden Co., 308 U.S. 188, 60 S.Ct. 182 (1939).
19 REPORT 83.
20 Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at 605-606, 71 S.Ct.
971 (1951). Italics added.
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which pie foreign country is not capable of producing.21 Local manufacture can be undertaken only with American know-how, designs,
drawings, technical assistance and perhaps license under foreign
patents. The American manufacturer may not be willing to part with
these and undertake to establish a potential competitor without securing a promise from the recipient not to sell in the United States or
other territory covered by the American company.22 Similarly, the
foreign licensee may be unwilling to undertake the manufacture of
the finished product, involving capital investment in plant and machinery and long-term expenditures for sales promotion, if he cannot
secure the promise from the American manufacturer not, in effect,
to destroy what has been transferred by competing in the foreign
manufacturer's area. Thus, such limited agreements not to compete
in certain territories may create the opportunity for the only trade
possible under the circumstances.23
This principle also operates the other way. Foreign firms may
have patents or know-how which American firms may desire to obtain
and which could develop entire industries in the United States, some
of them essential to our defense, and expand substantially the foreign
trade of the United States. The American firms may be able to acquire these patents and know-how only by agreeing not to compete
with the foreign company in certain territories which the foreign company considers its natural areas.
Such restraints would, of course, have to be re?sonably ancillary
to a lawful main purpose. As the committee has stated more particularly in connection with its discussion on patent licensing agreements
and agreements transferring know-how, the agreements would have
to be limited in scope to the products made possible by the know-how
and be reasonably limited in time, or, if based on patents, be within
the scope of the patent grant, limited in time, and otherwise conform
21 Or the foreign government may permit mportation of certain items, such as bear·
ings, only if there is first establishd locally the manufacture of standard sizes and types used
in that country. Then it may permit importation of the balance of sizes and types, i.e.,
those used in quantities too small to warrant profitable local manufacture.
2 2 " ••• we are constantly up against the question of whether there is any satisfactory basis for an American company to furnish technical assistance and information to a
foreign concern without exposing itself or other licensees to the risk of loss of their established markets either at home or abroad. It is quite apparent that, if the answer is flatly
negative, there is a very limited opportunity to increase the flow of technology to foreign
countries through private channels." Letter from Foreign Operations Administration to
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, REPORT 96.
23 "Out of such situations evolves a principle favoring transactions where the resource
of patents or 'know-how' is used with the primary purpose of increasing the inflow and
outflow of commerce and enhancing the well-being of the economies of the United States
and friendly foreign countries." REPORT 86.
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to the rules applicable generally to lawful patent licensing under the
Sherman Act. 24
Such agreements could not be excuses for cartels or for general
arrangements to divide markets or restrain international trade. Here,
of course, lies the real problem for the businessman and his lawyer.
What starts out as an ancillary restraint, lawful in purpose, almost inevitably becomes, with the passage of time and the effectuation of the
agreements not to compete, a complex of activity very little different
in its restrictive effect from a nonancillary agreement not to compete.
The foreign licensee wants to continue to receive new developments
and improvements. The American firm feels it should get the benefit
of any improvements the foreign firm makes on the products or processes which it has transferred. The question of how new territorities
shall be developed arises. In all of such transactions protection may
be desired by both parties. How can the businessman be sure that,
when scrutinized by the Department of Justice ten years later, his
once valid agreement will not have become coated with all the indicia of what is considered to be a general agreement not to compete
in each other's markets-a conclusively unreasonable type of restraint?25
The doctrine, therefore, permitting reasonable restraints in foreign
trade is really not a doctrine which insulates international business
from antitrust risks or which opens up foreign trade to business restraints. It is rather a doctrine in favor of a limited promotion of
foreign trade under present world conditions and in the public interest.
The status of the law, as interpreted by the committee, thus will
permit restrictions which will yield increases in our foreign trade,
but because of the inevitable risks of undertaking such restrictions
under the Sherman Act, it can be expected that businessmen will not
enter into such restrictions except in situations where other business
24 It should be pointed out that restraints ancillary to patent grants would generally
be too limited in scope to meet the practical needs of the situation. The patent-antitrust
cases hold any restraints which extend the monopoly beyond the grant to be either illegal
per se or unenforceable. Hence, what might be reasonable in the broader sense in con•
nection with transfers of know-how might be illegal if tested under the laws with respect
to patents. In general, however, securing patent licenses is a minor part of any such
arrangements with foreign concerns. The foreign firms desire patent immunity to the
extent it is necessary, but the important thing is to secure the know-how and technical
assistance without which, despite patent immunity, they would be incapable of producing
the goods.
25 Compare the judicial reactions to the "ancillary restraint" defenses in United States
v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83 F. Supp 284, affd. 341 U.S. 593,
71 S.Ct. 971 (1951); United States v. National Lead Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1945) 63 F. Supp.
513, affd. 332 U.S. 319, 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947); United States v. General Electric Co.,
(D.C. N.J. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 753.
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alternatives are not available and where, in fact, the business cannot
be done without some such restrictive arrangements.26
Parent-Subsidiary

With respect to agreements between parent and subsidiary to
divide markets or establish prices, or otherwise eliminate competition
between the parent and subsidiary, the Report applies the same doctrine for foreign commerce as for domestic. The cases are interpreted
as holding that concerted action solely between the parent and subsidiary or subsidiaries, which restrains no trade of outsiders but solely
that between the parent and its subsidiary, does not violate section 1.27
The committee rejects any implication to the contrary which might
be construed from some of Justice Jackson's dissenting language in
the Timhn case.28
The argument for this rule, especially as applied to foreign trade,
is that in most cases business cannot be done abroad without separate
incorporation and that it is unrealistic to require the parent and subsidiary to compete when, if the parent were operating through plants
located abroad, the same restriction on trade would be lawful. The
Report defines a subsidiary as one which is wholly-owned or where
minority foreign stockholders are not competitors but merely investors.29
The committee appears to deal only with the problem of subsidiaries established abroad by American companies and not with those
acquired. The Report does state that section 7 of the Clayton Act, as
amended, would appear to cover mergers of American and foreign
companies where there is the specified effect on commerce within the
United States.30 Hence, the acquisition of a foreign subsidiary which
had previously been engaged in exporting to the United States in
competition with the parent, or where the parent had previously been
engaged in exporting to the territory of the competitor, might provide
the requisites for violation of section 7. The argument, of course, can
be made that if a foreign company is a true subsidiary of an American
26 In many fields of world trade today, restrictions may have no business validity.
Agreements on territories cannot keep pace with changes in dollar availability, exchange
and tariff restrictions, and the shifting currents of world trade. Nor do American firms
in many low-cost, mass-production industries need protection in the American market
against foreign competition. Compare the recommendation of the REPORT (p. 342) for
antitrust as a justification for and objective of unilateral and negotiated tariff reductions.
27 REPORT 33-34.
2SREPORT 88-89. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 at
606-607, 71 S.Ct. 971 (1951). The committee also rejects any implication in United
States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947, that mere
investment abroad which results in a diminution of United States exports is an antitrust
violation.
29 REPORT 30, n. 106.
so REPORT 65, n. 1.
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corporation, there is no need for agreements in restraint of trade since
the controlled operation of the subsidiary itself would provide against
undesirable competition.31
In elaborating on its viewpoint that competition between parent
and subsidiary should not be required, the committee points out that
the result of the Timken case has been in fact to require competition
between a parent and subsidiary, while at the same time the Supreme
Court decision approved eventual acquisition of control over a competitor found to be, for many years previously, engaged in illegal cartel
agreements with the now American parent. The committee suggests
that the proper remedy should have been the dissolution decreed by
the lower court.32
Joint Activities Abroad
The Report expresses the view that manufacturing or distribution
activities carried on abroad jointly by American competitors33 alone,
or combined with foreign competitors, should not be illegal per se
since they may encourage trade by affording-means for sharing risks
of sometimes hazardous foreign operations. Such joint activities should
be deemed legal if, first, they involve no restrictions on American imports or exports, and second, do not unreasonably restrain competition
in the American domestic market.34
To meet these qualifications will prove a very difficult task for any
joint manufacturing operation despite a desirable and legitimate purpose. The activities of any joint manufacturing operation among competitors will produce effects and results which will be difficult to distinguish from traditional objectionable cartel consequences. For example, the amount of goods that the new joint subsidiary will produce
in foreign markets and the consequent extent to which export from
the United States by the American partners will be curtailed will
ordinarily be decided by agreement among the partners since they
would hardly be likely to invest capital abroad and continue to export
competitively to that area in derogation of their investment. Also, to
the extent certain goods are exported from the United States rather
than manufactured abroad by the joint subsidiary (or exported by a
31 Perhaps this would not be true where a strong minority interest existed since, without agreements which could be turned to as evidence of the relationship, the parent might
be accused of operating the subsidiary solely for the benefit of the parent and to the detriment of the interest of minority stockholders.
32 REPORT 36; United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., (D.C. Ohio 1949) 83
F. Supp. 284.
3 3 Joint manufacturing activities by noncompetitors would ordinarily create no antitrust problems.
34 REPORT 90.
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foreign partner), agreement between the parent companies will probably be required to determine how much each member will export
and the selling prices, particularly if the joint subsidiary, as is usually
the case, will handle the distribution of exported materials. Furthermore, since the purpose of such a joint manufacturing subsidiary is
to get business abroad which would otherwise not be obtainable, and
since it will inevitably be operating in competition with exports from
nonmember 6.rms, it will be very difficult for such operations to be
conducted without creating the appearance that they constitute an
enterprise to eliminate and restrict competition.35
It would seem that any jointly-owned manufacturing or distributing organization inherently involves some division of markets and
price-fixing, and a division of markets and price-6.xing among competitors is per se illegal. The committee really sidesteps this important
issue. Yet such joint ventures are the basis for many foreign operations
of American businesses.36

Coordinating Cold War Activities
Since strict antitrust enforcement may, at times, have damaging
effects on the cold war activities of our government and on other
aspects of its foreign policy, the committee recommends the extension
of the Defense Production Act,37 at least with respect to programs for
preserving the supply of critical and strategic materials from abroad. 38
This act permits the President to request competitors to enter into
voluntary agreements upon a 6.nding that the action is vital to the
national defense. The agreements are subject to the approval of the
attorney general and may involve activities which would otherwise be
illegal under the Sherman Act.39
The committee also recommends that the immunity under this
act cover conduct for a designated period of time beyond the act's
expiration where the needs of national defense require it and where
no alternative method less restrictive on competition appears possible.
Such agreements could be terminated by the President if no longer
in the national interest.40
35 Cf.

Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 at 15, 65 S.Ct. 1416 (1945).
Note the committee's lame treatment of United States v. Minnesota Mining &
Mfg. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1950) 92 F. Supp. 947 at 962, 963 on this issue. REPORT 91.
37 64 Stat. L. 798 (1950), 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §2061 et seq., as amended, 67
Stat. L. 129 (1953), 50 U.S.C.A. App. (Cum. Supp. 1954) §2062 et seq.
38 REPORT 109.
39 REPORT 108.
40 REPORT 109.
36
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The Report also recommends advance discussion on projected antitrust proceedings by the Department of Justice with other affected
government agencies where the proceedings may involve national
defense or other government foreign programs. This is stated to be a
continuation of existing procedures followed in certain cases where
the Justice Department has consulted with the State and Defense
Departments as well as the National Security Council.41 In addition
to avoiding antitrust litigation in conllict with foreign policy, such
procedures might enable the Justice Department to obtain additional
facts regarding the substance of the charges. It might provide desirable
information as to the form of the suit, the relief, and the timing of
proceedings.
One member comments that antitrust litigation, so modified or
discontinued by means of executive consultation, would not result
in protection against private damage suit for such conduct, thus nullifying the effect of such executive action on foreign policy and penalizing conduct encouraged by the government.42 Only legislation could
provide immunity against such private suits. Such deprivation of
compensation for loss to private parties caused by otherwise illegal
acts, it may be argued, requires executive proceedings which would
guarantee that exemptions of restrictive conduct would be limited to
what was strictly necessary in the national interest, would not be
granted if alternative less restrictive means would achieve the results,
would be limited in time, and would be subject to periodic review.
Another member of the committee, while approving Executive action in this area, expresses the view that Congress should define the
exemption power and place as much as possible of the fact-finding and
decision-rendering in "normal deliberative tribunals" as a safeguard
against what he believes to be a tendency of the executive in the past
unnecessarily to waive antitrust in favor of other considerations of
national interest.43
UN Proposal44

The committee does not pass on the UN proposal for regulating
international restrictive business practices. It maintains that the prob41 REPORT 97-98.
42 REPORT 98.
43 REPORT 293.
4 4 See generally Carlston,

"Antitrust Policy Abroad," 49 N.W. UNIV. L. REv. 713
at 723 (1955); Domke, "The United Nations Draft Convention on Restrictive Business
Practices," 4 lNTr.. & CoMP. L. Q. 129 (1955); Edwards, "Regulation of Monopolistic
Cartelization," 14 Omo ST. L. J. 252 (1953); .Edwards, "Inadequacy of National Regulation of Cartels and Proposed Control by United Nations," 14 G.no. WASH. L. REv. 626
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lem is primarily one of international relations rather than of antitrust
policy.45 Nevertheless, the Report does contain two discussions of the
proposal, one, a dissent from the committee's decision not to comment,
which supports the UN's draft articles of agreement, 46 and a rejoinder
opposing the UN proposal.47 It would have been the better course,
perhaps, for the majority to have examined the proposal or at least
to have set forth its analysis of the problem, showing its relation to
international relations rather than antitrust.
The UN proposal cannot be viewed simply as a program for international, as distinguished from national, enforcement of antitrust
policy. International law is founded upon mutual objectives and policies in :6.elds which extend outside the effective jurisdiction of any
single country, e.g., maritime rules, regulation of narcotics and whiteslave traffic, etc. In the :6.eld of antitrust, however, there are few
countries other than the United States which have any effective antitrust policies or enforcement programs. Moreover, there are nations
in the UN whose policies are opposed to antitrust. Some countries,
less devoted to private enterprise as an economic institution, may view
antitrust as a means by which private enterprise can be discredited
in the eyes of the public so as to facilitate nationalization. Such countries are unlikely to be interested in using antitrust to increase competition among private :6.rms. The communist countries not only are
disinterested in antitrust but are instead dedicated to destroying free
enterprise throughout the world. They can be expected to exploit
any UN program for political purposes against free enterprise and
the capitalistic free world. It would seem, therefore, that these are
problems as much for diplomats and our State Department experts as
for antitrust lawyers and professors. 48 Our idealism and enthusiasm
for the achievements of antitrust in this country should not lead us
into a program which could set back rather than further the cause of
antitrust in the rest of the world.
(1946); Kopper, "The International Regulation of Cartels-Current Proposals," 40 VA.
L. REv. 1005 (1954); Lockwood and Schmeisser, "Restrictive Business Practices in International Trade," II LAw & CoNT.llM. PROB. 663 (1946); Lubin, "U. S. Proposes U.N.
Action on Cartels," 25 Dept. of State Bul. 590 (1951); Timberg, ''Restrictive Business
Practices," 2 AM. J. CoMP. L. 445 (1953); REsTRICTIVE BusINEss PRACTICES, UNESCO
Official Records, 16th Sess., Supp. 11, IIA and IIB (1953).
4 5 In connection with the committee's views as to its qualifications for appraising the
UN proposal, it should be noted that the government liaison groups attached to the committee did not include personnel from the Department of State. REPORT viii.
46 REPORT 98-105.
47 REPORT 105-108.
48 The Attorney General's National Committee itself may be regarded as a good
precedent for appointment by the President of a committee of qualified experts to evaluate
and make recommendations regarding the UN proposal.
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It would be unfortunate, nonetheless, if the United States should
tum its back upon efforts to promote antitrust in the free world.49
It is in our trading and political interest abroad to encourage the growth
of antitrust philosophy as the key to a successful and expansionist pri·
vate enterprise economy. For restrictive and nonexpansionist private
enterprise is not likely to succeed in preserving the world's people
from communism. The wide difference between public attitudes t~
ward business in the United States and in Europe stems from the
expansionist philosophy of American business, nurtured by antitrust,
with its resultant prosperous economy and high standard of livin&
as compared with the nonexpansionist, market-dividing, restrictive
theories of European business.
Perhaps a better international cartel program, designed to promote
antitrust objectives as well as to eliminate friction regarding extra·
territorial application, would be step-by-step bilateral agreements with
those nations, such as Canada, which have laws and policies similar
to ours. Such agreements could establish procedures for dealing with
restrictive practices that have an impact in both countries and can be
dealt with satisfactorily by neither alone and could provide experience
for further progress in this field.
·
Conclusion

Considering the different shades of opm10n represented on the
committee, the Foreign Trade Section of the Report is remarkable for
the degree of unanimity attained. The conclusions and recommendations agreed upon constitute a consensus which cannot be cast aside
or ignored. In an area vexed by confusion and extreme positions, the
Report provides a foundation for the clarification and solution of antitrust problems in the foreign trade field. 50
The Report reminds us that, in a world of economic restriction
and political tyranny, the United States remains the example par exellence throughout world history of a free enterprise system. We do
not need to despoil the Sherman Act nor need we fear that business
will be, in tum, despoiled by the act. Modifications of the statutory
49 It should be noted that our antitrust enforcement against cartels has in itself destroyed many international cartels through the elimination of the participation of American
firms, in many cases the leading members of their respective industries. It is doubtful that
major international cartels can effectively control world markets in the face of competition
and noncooperation from American industry. BERGE, CARTELS: CHALLENGE To A FREE
WoRLD 18 (1944).
50 Criticism will undoubtedly be made that the Report does not provide "do and
don't" solutions to each specific problem. This quest for certainty, desirable as it may be,
is unfortunately not the destiny of man under the antitrust laws or any other laws. See
Levi, "An Introduction to Legal Reasoning," 15 UNIV. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1948).
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provisions are not needed. We can continue on a case-by-case basis,
recognizing that within the Rule of Reason there is sufficient flexibility
for maintaining strict enforcement consonant with the special problems and difficulties besetting foreign trade today. We can enforce
the act but with due regard for the rights and liabilities imposed by the
laws of other countries.
As ~ means for providing expert and competent enlightenment on
difficult national problems, and as an aid to Congress in resolving difficult and sometimes technical public issues, the Attorney General has
provided a procedure which should be used more often. It is a method
for approaching difficult problems that is truly in the democratic tradition. Even if the conclusions produce further controversy and discussion, it can only be helpful to have had this careful, exhaustive
study of an important public issue by this group of outstanding professionals.

